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10  
11 **UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT**  
12 **CENTRAL DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA**

13 PERFECT 10, INC., a California  
14 Corporation

15 Plaintiff,

16 vs.

17 GOOGLE INC., a corporation; and  
18 DOES 1 through 100, inclusive

19 Defendant.

20 Case No. CV04-9484 AHM (SHx)

21 **GOOGLE'S OPPOSITION TO**  
22 **PERFECT 10'S MOTION FOR**  
23 **PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

24 Date: November 7, 2005  
25 Time: 10:00 a.m.  
26 Location: Courtroom 14

27  
28  
Winston & Strawn LLP  
101 California Street  
San Francisco, CA 94111-5894

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Over four years after sending demands to Google, and over nine months after  
3 filing this action, Perfect 10 has moved for a preliminary injunction to force Google to  
4 endure a process by which Perfect 10, without court review, may continuously dictate  
5 to Google how Google must alter the Web index at the heart of its search engine.

6 Perfect 10's motion fails every criterion. Perfect 10 has not proved probable, or  
7 even reasonably possible, success on the merits. It cannot show irreparable harm, and  
8 indeed its own delays make this motion a non-starter even without considering the  
9 other factors. The balance of hardships weighs against an injunction. Finally, the  
10 public interest is extremely strong in avoiding an injunction that would hobble  
11 Google's widely used and beneficial search engine.

12 **II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND**

13 **A. GOOGLE'S SEARCH ENGINE AND RELATED ACTIVITIES**

14 **1. Web And Image Search Engine**

15 Google's search engine systematically and comprehensively explores the  
16 vastness of the World Wide Web, retrieves and stores pages and files located on the  
17 Web in storage called a "cache," indexes those pages and files, and delivers to users  
18 search results based on the likely relevance of those pages and files to search terms  
19 entered by users. The Web is an open, network service that operates over the Internet  
20 by means of the hypertext transfer protocol ("HTTP"), which enables the linking of a  
21 vast number of documents across the Internet. "Browser" software programs such as  
22 Internet Explorer and Netscape enable the transfer and display, across the Web, of  
23 pages that are formatted using Hypertext Markup Language ("HTML") as well as  
24 images, word processing documents, and other files. The Web connects resources and  
25 users in countless ways. Declaration of John Levine ("Levine Dec.") ¶7.

26 Google's search engine has become one of the most significant and widely used  
27 research tools in the world. The variety of its research uses is immense and Google is  
28

1 a staple educational resource. See Levine Dec. ¶14; Declaration of Andrew P. Bridges  
2 (“Bridges Dec.”) ¶2 and Ex. C.<sup>1</sup>

3 Google delivers search results at no charge to either users or providers of  
4 information. Google does not require accounts or subscriptions for its general public  
5 search engine use that is at issue in this litigation. Declaration of Alexander  
6 Macgillivray (“Macgillivray Dec.”) ¶4. Like a number of other media, Google’s  
7 search engine is primarily advertising-supported, as described below.

8 When the Google Web Search engine receives a query, it searches its index for  
9 pages relevant to the query. It then returns Web page links with snippets of relevant  
10 text. It also provides a link to Google’s “cached” copy of the text portion of the Web  
11 page. By clicking on the “cached” link, the user will cause the cached page to appear.  
12 While it may seem that the cached page contains images, in fact the images are not  
13 from the Web Search cache; in fact, a user’s web browser fetches any images from  
14 their original location and not from Google’s servers.<sup>2</sup> Macgillivray Dec. ¶2; Levine  
15 Dec. ¶21. Google also provides a link for a version of the cached page that will  
16 disable this browser function. Macgillivray Dec. ¶2.

17 When the Google Image Search engine responds to a query, it searches its index  
18 for image files (stored in an index apart from the index for Web page files) that are  
19 relevant to the query based on the text of their associated Web pages. (Google does  
20 not have a technology that is able to translate the pixels of an image into a searchable  
21

22 <sup>1</sup> In addition to its research functions, the Google search engine has a news reporting  
23 function as it updates its search results to reflect the current status of the Web. Google  
24 Alerts delivers updated search results to a user. See [www.google.com/alerts?hl=en](http://www.google.com/alerts?hl=en)  
(copy attached as Ex. B to Bridges Dec.). In addition, Google’s ranking of search  
25 results and its assignment of “PageRank” scores to pages gives Google’s opinion of  
26 the significance and relevance of pages and files on the Web. See *Search King, Inc. v.*  
*Google Technology, Inc.*, 2003 WL 21464568 at \*4 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003); see  
27 also H. Davis, *Building Research Tools with Google for Dummies* (2005), pg. 47 (Ex.  
28 C to Bridges Dec.). (“Research Tools”).

<sup>2</sup> In the HTML programming customary for Web pages, images are not part of the  
page itself. Instead, the HTML code for a Web page identifies a separate file where  
the image is stored. When a browser shows a Web page with images, the browser  
obtains the text and images from different locations and knits them together into a  
single display. Levine Dec. ¶16.



1 textual description.) *See also Research Tools* at 137 (Ex. C to Bridges Dec.).

2 The Image Search engine returns results consisting of a page of “thumbnail”  
3 images – small low-resolution extracts of original images that aid the user in  
4 identifying and locating the image most relevant to the research. Macgillivray Dec.  
5 ¶3. The browser obtains “thumbnail” images from Google’s server, together with  
6 information about the Web page associated with the image. The user then can choose  
7 to click on the image thumbnail and show more information about the image and  
8 cause the user’s browser (typically Internet Explorer, Netscape, Mozilla Firefox, or  
9 Opera) to open a “window” on the screen that will display the underlying Web page in  
10 a process called “framing.” Macgillivray Dec. ¶3. *See also Research Tools* at 138-39  
11 (Bridges Dec. Ex. C.). **Dr. Zada’s declaration, its exhibit 8 with the narration by**  
12 **Patrick Swart, and the accompanying Swart Declaration mislead the Court when**  
13 **they refer to the new window in the browser display and then refer and point to**  
14 **the address bar of the browser, which continues to show a “google.com” location,**  
15 **to imply that the lower window is coming from google.com. The new material**  
16 **displayed in the browser’s lower window comes from the underlying site, not**  
17 **from Google.**<sup>3</sup>

## 18 2. Google's Advertising Programs

19 Google has two web advertising programs, AdWords for advertisers and  
20 AdSense for web publishers. Macgillivray Dec. ¶9 and Ex. A.

21 Through Google's AdWords program, advertisers purchase advertising

22 <sup>3</sup> The address bar to which the demonstration misleadingly points corresponds to the  
23 *top* window of the browser, which displays only a selected “thumbnail,” and not to the  
24 *bottom* window of the browser, which displays the source Web page or image file of  
25 Google's search result. In fact, despite the misleading commentary and declarations  
26 (at 1:15-1:22 of the demonstration), the display on the demonstration CD specifically  
27 says “Below is the image in its **original context** on the page [www.3thehardway.nl/.../vibesorensen002.html](http://www.3thehardway.nl/.../vibesorensen002.html)” (emphasis in original). When the demonstration navigates  
28 within that window, at 1:22-2:27 of the demonstration, the display is coming from the  
underlying Web site and not from Google, contrary to the narrative of the  
demonstration. The division of the display into distinct windows drawing from  
diverse sources, sometimes called “framing,” is a common function of Internet  
browsers, and the browser carries out the navigation function shown in the  
demonstration without involvement by Google. Levine Dec. ¶24, n 1.

1 placement on Google's pages, including its search engine, Gmail web-based email  
2 service and other services, or on third party Web sites. Macgillivray Dec. ¶9.

3 Google's AdSense program is available to third-party Web publishers. AdSense  
4 allows third-party sites to carry Google-sponsored advertising and share revenue that  
5 flows from the advertising displays and click-throughs (advertising derived from the  
6 "clickthrough" referral from one site to another). AdSense advertising is related to  
7 text in the AdSense participant's Web site or search key words.<sup>4</sup> Macgillivray Dec.  
8 ¶10.

9 The Google AdSense Program Policies specifically exclude sites with Image  
10 Results from participating in the AdSense program. The Policy states: "Copyrighted  
11 Material: In order to avoid associations with copyright claims, website publishers  
12 may not display Google ads on web pages with MP3, Video, News Groups, and Image  
13 Results." In addition, it is Google's intention to exclude sites with pornography, adult,  
14 or mature content, along with certain other categories of content, such as gambling  
15 and profanity, from its AdSense program. Macgillivray Dec. ¶11 and Ex. B (Google  
16 AdSense Program Policies).<sup>5</sup> The Google AdSense Terms and Conditions, execution  
17 of which is a prerequisite to participating in the AdSense program, state that "You  
18 represent and warrant that . . . each Site and any material displayed therein: (i) comply  
19 with all applicable laws, statutes, ordinances and regulations; (ii) do not breach and  
20 have not breached any duty toward or rights of any person or entity including, without  
21 limitation, rights of intellectual property, publicity or privacy . . . (iii) are not  
22 pornographic, hate-related or otherwise violent in content." Macgillivray Dec. ¶12  
23 and Ex. C (AdSense Terms and Conditions). Perfect 10 asserts that certain AdSense

24 <sup>4</sup> To participate, a Web site publisher places code on its site that asks Google's servers  
25 to algorithmically select relevant advertisements when a user loads the Web page. A  
26 Web site publisher identifies its site and receives a token and javascript from Google  
27 that the Web site publisher can then use on a page to receive targeted advertising.  
28 Google does not control the location of javascript placement. Macgillivray Dec. ¶10

<sup>5</sup> Despite the fact that the current version of Google's AdSense Program Policies is  
posted on Google's Web site, Dr. Zada attached a dated version of the Policies that he  
printed on September 14, 2004, and does not reflect the current language. *See* Zada  
Dec. ¶25 (quoting from year old version of Google's AdSense Program Policies).

1 partners violate this policy and put the AdSense javascript on pages that contain  
2 pornographic images. This merely illustrates Google's lack of control over where  
3 third parties choose to place the javascript that triggers AdSense advertising.  
4 Moreover, Google reserves the right to terminate third parties from AdSense when it  
5 becomes aware that they are violating the AdSense Policies or Terms and Conditions,  
6 and is in the process of reviewing Perfect 10 notices and will terminate sites from  
7 participation in AdSense that are in violation. Macgillivray Dec. ¶13.

### 8 3. Google's Copyright Policy

9 It is Google's policy diligently to respond to notices of alleged infringement that  
10 comply with Section 512(c)(3) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act, 17 U.S.C.  
11 § 512(c)(3). Macgillivray Dec. ¶14. Google provides a detailed explanation of its  
12 policy in response to notices of alleged infringement at its google.com Web site. *Id.*  
13 and Ex. D (Google's Terms of Service and DMCA policy).

14 Google receives thousands of inquiries daily concerning search results,  
15 including notices about search results that link to allegedly improper content. Those  
16 notices concern various issues, including claims that third-party Web sites have  
17 infringed the senders' copyright, trademark or other rights. Google has several  
18 departments involved in handling notices of alleged infringement. Macgillivray Dec.  
19 ¶15.

20 Trained individuals process notices of alleged infringement that refer to  
21 copyright. If a notice does not contain enough information for Google to process, or if  
22 it otherwise fails the requirements of 17 U.S.C. §512(c)(3), but contains contact  
23 information for the sender, Google's staff will typically email the sender requesting  
24 additional information. Macgillivray Dec. ¶15.

25 Upon receiving a notice of alleged infringement that substantially conforms  
26 with the requirements of Section 512(c)(3), Google expeditiously removes or disables  
27 access to the material. Macgillivray Dec. ¶16. Google does this by flagging the URL  
28 or URL pattern for which Google has received notice so that page or file will no

1 longer appear in Search results. For Web Search, the page URL is suppressed; for  
2 Image Search, the image file URL is suppressed. Macgillivray Dec. ¶16.

### 3 **B. PERFECT 10'S BUSINESS ACTIVITIES**

4 Perfect 10 publishes a magazine and Web site devoted to photographs of nude  
5 women who have not had surgical breast enhancement. Perfect 10 appears to have  
6 met with little commercial success. Perfect 10 magazine has no significant  
7 advertising. See Bridges Dec. ¶¶5-6 and Ex. D. See also D. Weddle, *Among the*  
8 *Mansions of Eden: Tales of Love, Lust, and Land in Beverly Hills* 65 (2003) (Ex. O to  
9 Bridges Dec.) (explaining low readership of Perfect 10 and that its CEO Norm Zada  
10 (previously Zadeh) "isn't in it for the money, he's in it for the lifestyle") ("Mansions  
11 of Eden").

### 12 **C. GOOGLE'S INTERACTIONS WITH PERFECT 10**

13 Perfect 10 claims that since May 2004 Google has refused to respond to notices  
14 by Dr. Zada of infringements by third-party Web sites. Preliminary Injunction Motion  
15 ("PIM") at 6-7. That is false. Since May 2004, Google has received more than forty  
16 communications from Dr. Zada regarding a plethora of alleged infringements and  
17 publicity violations by various Web sites. Macgillivray ¶19. The notices listed  
18 thousands of URLs and Web sites which Dr. Zada claimed violated the rights of  
19 Perfect 10 and unrelated third parties. Google diligently and promptly responded to  
20 Dr. Zada's notices with respect to Perfect 10's alleged rights. Macgillivray Dec. ¶19.

21 Dr. Zada's communications were impossible to process completely, for a  
22 number of reasons. Perfect 10's notices were vastly overbroad, dealing often with  
23 unrelated third parties and non-copyright issues; they were incomplete and shoddy in  
24 light of the Section 512(c)(3) requirements; and they were delivered in a manner that  
25 impeded efficient handling by Google. Macgillivray Dec. ¶20.

26 Frequently Dr. Zada's communications did not provide enough information.  
27 For example, notices beginning on May 31, 2004 through July 2004, simply listed  
28 URLs, without sufficiently identifying the copyrighted work claimed to have been

1 infringed or the nature of the infringement. *See, e.g., Zada Decl., Ex. 40.* Macgillivray  
2 Dec. ¶20, Ex. E (notices Google received from Dr. Zada from May 31, 2004 through  
3 July 11, 2004). Google promptly responded to Dr. Zada's notices, explaining that he  
4 needed to specify the material protected by copyright. Macgillivray Dec. ¶20, Ex. F  
5 (Google e-mails to Dr. Zada).

6 On October 11, 2004 (a month before this lawsuit was filed), in response to  
7 Google's requests, Dr. Zada finally provided notices in a format that identified Perfect  
8 10 magazine issue and page numbers of images whose copyright Dr. Zada claimed to  
9 have been infringed, at least for some of the listed URLs. Macgillivray Dec. ¶21, Ex.  
10 G (notices Google received from Dr. Zada from October 11, 2004 through June 19,  
11 2005).<sup>6</sup> Even though those notices were deficient, beginning on October 11, 2004,  
12 Google promptly processed Dr. Zada's notices that Google could confirm identified  
13 URLs that did in fact contain images of semi-naked or naked women that looked like  
14 they might have been Perfect 10 images and were indexed by Google,<sup>7</sup> and suppressed  
15 those showing up in response to user queries in Web Search. Macgillivray Dec. ¶21,  
16 Ex. F. **Despite the difficulties with, and size of, Dr. Zada's notices, with only four  
17 exceptions<sup>8</sup> Google processed Dr. Zada's October 11, 2004 notice and later**  
18

19 <sup>6</sup> One communication from Dr. Zada on July 7, 2004 partially identified some  
20 information but that communication was itself noncompliant with section 512(c)(3).  
21 Although Google processed Dr. Zada's notifications, they did not comply with the  
22 DMCA's requirements that a notice must identify "the copyrighted work claimed to  
23 have been infringed, or, if multiple copyrighted works at a single online site are  
24 covered by a single notification, a representative list of such works at that site" and  
25 "identification of the material that is claimed to be infringing or to be the subject of  
26 infringing activity and that is to be removed or access to which is to be disabled, and  
27 information reasonably sufficient to permit the service provider to locate the  
28 material." *See* 17 U.S.C. 512(c)(3)(ii) and (iii). Moreover, many of Dr. Zada's notices  
did not comply with the Section 512(c)(3)'s requirement that notifications must be  
"provided to the designated agent of a service provider." Macgillivray Dec. ¶21.  
<sup>8</sup> The four exceptions involve Exs. 58, 66, 67, and 68 of Dr. Zada's Declaration.  
Google processed the notice attached as Ex. 68 in 19 days. Google has not, to its  
knowledge, received the notices attached as Exs. 66 and 67. Through their inclusion  
as exhibits, Google now has them and Exs. 66 and 67 are now being processed. Due  
to miscommunication, Google did not complete processing of Ex. 58. Once the  
mistake was discovered, Google restarted processing this "notice," which will be  
reflected in Google search results shortly. Macgillivray Dec. ¶22.

1 notices within two weeks of receipt, often within one week.<sup>9</sup> Macgillivray Dec.  
2 ¶22.

3 Dr. Zada claims that “Google, via its Image Search, is continuing to display at  
4 least 1,043 Perfect 10 images from, and link at least 1,043 Perfect 10 images to, web  
5 pages that Perfect 10 specifically notified Google were infringing Perfect 10  
6 copyrights.” Zada Decl. ¶96, Ex. 81 (spreadsheet reflecting URLs of web pages from  
7 which Dr. Zada claims Google continued to display infringing images after notice.)  
8 This characterization is entirely *misleading*. First, none of the URLs in Ex. 81  
9 identify .jpg or image file locations, but link to Web pages that may contain hundreds  
10 of images, for many of which Perfect 10 has not alleged ownership of copyright.  
11 Macgillivray Decl. ¶24. When Dr. Zada identified a Web page with numerous  
12 images, Google would be able to process the *Web* page to block it from appearing in  
13 response to a Google Web Search (which Google did) but would not be able to  
14 prevent a specific image from appearing in response to a search on Image Search,  
15 because no *image* file would have been identified and Google did not have the  
16 necessary information to block the image. Macgillivray Dec. ¶24.

17 Google analyzed the 470 URLs identified by Dr. Zada in his Exhibit 81. Of  
18 those 470 URLs, before Perfect 10 filed this motion, Google had already processed  
19 414 of them to block them from appearing in response to a Google Web Search. Of  
20 the 56 remaining URLs, 21 are not true URLs, but rather end in ellipses and are not  
21 fully qualified URLs. Macgillivray Dec. ¶25. Of the 35 remaining URLs, nine are  
22 either inactive or do not contain any images of women, other than images that have no  
23 connection to rights asserted by Perfect 10. Declaration of Susan E. Lee, ¶2.

24 <sup>9</sup> Processing termination notices, particularly those that list hundreds or thousands of  
25 URLs, like Dr. Zada's, is an involved process. First, the notice is routed to the proper  
26 person for handling (a process that is delayed when the sender does not include  
27 recipient information, as was the case with a number of Dr. Zada's notices), then the  
28 data from the notice must be hand entered and checked, then the allegedly infringing  
URLs must be reviewed, and questionable URLs re-reviewed, then a list is made and  
submitted for a check against the URLs in Google's index. Only at that point can a  
removal happen, which must then be carried out on Google's numerous servers.  
Macgillivray Dec. ¶23.

1 Google continues to promptly process new notices from Dr. Zada that  
2 substantially conform with Section 512(c). Macgillivray Dec. ¶22.

3 **III. ARGUMENT**

4 **A. PERFECT 10 HAS FAILED TO JUSTIFY A PRELIMINARY**  
5 **INJUNCTION BECAUSE IT HAS NOT ESTABLISHED**  
6 **PROBABLE SUCCESS OR SERIOUS QUESTIONS, IT HAS NOT**  
7 **SHOWN IMMEDIATE IRREPARABLE HARM, IT DRAGGED**  
8 **ITS FEET, THE BALANCE OF HARMS IS UNFAVORABLE,**  
9 **AND THE PUBLIC INTEREST OPPOSES AN INJUNCTION.**

10 A preliminary injunction is inappropriate unless a “plaintiff can show either:  
11 (1) a combination of probable success on the merits and the possibility of irreparable  
12 harm; or (2) that serious questions are raised and the balance of hardships tilts in the  
13 plaintiff's favor.” *Elvis Presley Ents., Inc., v. Passport Video*, 349 F.3d 622, 627 (9th  
14 Cir. 2003). Preliminary injunctions are not appropriate “[w]here no new harm is  
15 imminent, and where no compelling reason is apparent.” *Oakland Tribune, Inc. v.*  
16 *Chronicle Publishing Co.*, 762 F.2d 1374, 1377 (9th Cir. 1985). A party seeking a  
17 mandatory injunction must meet a higher standard, showing a clear likelihood of  
18 success. *Dahl v. HEM Pharmaceuticals Corp.*, 7 F.3d 1399, 1403 (9th Cir. 1993)).

19 “The plaintiff's burden of showing a likelihood of success on the merits  
20 includes the burden of showing a likelihood that it would prevail against any  
21 affirmative defenses<sup>10</sup> raised by the defendant.” *Dr. Seuss Enterprises, L.P. v.*  
22 *Penguin Books USA, Inc.*, 924 F. Supp. 1559, 1562 (S.D. Cal. 1996), *aff'd*, 109 F.3d  
23 1394 (9th Cir. 1997) (citing *Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of Am. Inc.*, 975 F.2d 832,  
24 837 (Fed. Cir. 1992)); *Religious Tech Ctr. v. Netcom On-Line Comm'n Servs.*, 923 F.  
25 Supp. 1231, 1242 n. 12 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“*Netcom*”).

26 Moreover, a movant must show not only irreparable harm but also immediate

27 <sup>10</sup> While Perfect 10 bears the burden on the motion even if fair use is an affirmative  
28 defense, Google does not concede that fair use is one. *See Sony Corp. of Am. v.*  
*Universal City Studios*, 464 U.S. 417, 434 (1984) (referring to plaintiff's burden); 17  
U.S.C. §107 (fair use as limitation on exclusive rights of section 106); Supp. Report of  
the Register of Copyrights on the General Revision of the U.S. Copyright Law: 1965  
Revision Bill, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Copyright Law Revision Part 6 (House  
Committee Print 1965) at 28 (rejecting proposal to put burden on fair user in language  
that became the 1976 Copyright Act).

1 harm if an injunction does not issue. *Caribbean Marine Services Co., Inc. v.*  
2 *Baldrige*, 844 F.2d 668, 674 (9th Cir. 1988). Delay “implies a lack of urgency and  
3 irreparable harm.” *Oakland Tribune*, 762 F.2d at 1377.

4 **B. PERFECT 10 CANNOT ESTABLISH PROBABLE SUCCESS OR**  
5 **SERIOUS QUESTIONS ON THE MERITS.**

6 **1. Google's Search Engine Operations Are Fair Use.**

7 The fair use doctrine helps to fulfill, and is not in derogation of, the objectives  
8 of copyright law. See P. Leval, *Toward a Fair Use Standard*, 103 Harv. L. Rev. 1105,  
9 1107 (1990) (“Leval”); see also *Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc.*, 510 U.S. 569,  
10 575 (1994). Copyright’s constitutional purpose is to “promote Progress of Science  
11 and the Useful Arts,” U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 8, and the nonexclusive statutory  
12 factors in 17 U.S.C. §107 are to be considered “in light of the objectives of copyright  
13 law,” *Kelly v. Arriba Soft Corp.*, 336 F.3d 811, 818 (9th Cir. 2003).

14 Perfect 10’s fair use analysis misses both the forest *and* the trees. In addition  
15 to incompletely and in many cases erroneously analyzing the nonexclusive statutory  
16 fair use factors, Perfect 10 conspicuously disregards the overarching principle from  
17 which the fair use doctrine naturally flows. Copyright law, after all, “is designed . . .  
18 to stimulate activity and progress in the arts for the intellectual enrichment of the  
19 public.” Leval at 1107. “From its beginning, the law of copyright has developed in  
20 response to significant changes in technology,” *Sony Corp.*, 464 U.S. at 430; see also  
21 *Atari*, 975 F.2d at 843 (citations omitted). The Ninth Circuit has specifically  
22 recognized the fair-use value of “improving access to information on the Internet.”  
23 *Kelly*, 336 F.3d at 819. When tested by all relevant factors and considerations, any  
24 “use” by the Google search engine operation here is fair.

25 **a. The Purpose And Character Of The Use**

26 The preamble to the fair use statute lists several purposes that typically give rise  
27 to fair use, including “criticism, comment, news reporting, teaching (including  
28 multiple copies for classroom use), scholarship, or research.” 17 U.S.C. §107. As



1 shown below, courts also evaluate the public interest in a fair use.

2 The purpose and character of each of the Google search engine's challenged  
3 operations<sup>11</sup> weigh overwhelmingly in favor of fair use. **Google's purpose and use**  
4 **are not to exploit Perfect 10's works.** They are (1) to index as broadly as reasonably  
5 possible the universe of information on the World Wide Web and (2) to locate,  
6 identify, and rank pointers to information relevant to users' research. Google is one of  
7 the most important research tools in the world, improving access to information on the  
8 Web, and it also has a significant role in news reporting and commentary.

9 Courts have recognized that intermediate copying may be required to achieve  
10 lawful purposes, and they recognize some intermediate copying as fair use. *See Sony*  
11 *Computer Entertainment, Inc. v. Connectix Corp.*, 203 F.3d 596, 602-03 (9th Cir.  
12 2000). Fair use can be based on unauthorized copies. *See NXIVM Corp. v. The Ross*  
13 *Inst.*, 364 F.3d 471, 477-80, 482 (2d Cir. 2004).

14 Google's Web Search cache is an essential component of Google's search  
15 operation. Levine Dec. ¶20. The purpose and character of Google's Image Search  
16 cache, to present thumbnail indexes of links to Web searchers so that they may better  
17 find relevant images, are indistinguishable from those that *Kelly* validated and  
18 permitted. Google, like Arriba's search engine, "functions as a tool to help index and

19  
20 <sup>11</sup> Perfect 10 alleges the following are direct infringements: (1) Google's "caching," or  
21 storage, of copies of Web pages and files as the foundation of its search engine index;  
22 (2) Google's presentation of reduced-size "thumbnail" images in response to user  
23 searches; (3) Google's providing a link from thumbnails to the underlying Web pages;  
24 and (4) "framing," the triggering of a Web browser function to display both Google's  
25 search result and the underlying Web page in adjoining windows on the browser's  
26 interface. Perfect 10 alleges these violate its rights of reproduction, "distribution,"  
27 and display under 17 U.S.C. §106. The so-called "distribution" right is not implicated  
28 here. The specific right identified in the Copyright Act is "to distribute copies or  
phonorecords of a copyrighted work to the public by sale or other transfer of  
ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending." 17 U.S.C. §106(3). "Copies" and  
"phonorecords" are both defined in 17 U.S.C. §101 as "material objects." There is no  
suggestion that Google either engages in or assists in the distribution of any material  
objects, and without that there is no valid distribution claim. *See Agee v. Paramount*  
*Comm'ns*, 59 F.3d 317, 325-26 (2d Cir. 1995). Moreover, there is no allegation that  
Google has engaged in "sale or other transfer of ownership, or . . . rental, lease, or  
lending" of copies as required by section 107. The direct infringement claim must  
therefore be limited to assertion of the reproduction and display rights.

